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Abstract
We present the DryVR framework for verifying hybrid control sys-
tems that are described by a combination of a black-box simulator for
trajectories and a white-box transition graph specifying mode switches.
The framework includes (a) a probabilistic algorithm for learning sensi-
tivity of the continuous trajectories from simulation data, (b) a bounded
reachability analysis algorithm that uses the learned sensitivity, and (c)
reasoning techniques based on simulation relations and sequential com-
position, that enable verification of complex systems under long switch-
ing sequences, from the reachability analysis of a simpler system under
shorter sequences. We demonstrate the utility of the framework by veri-
fying a suite of automotive benchmarks that include powertrain control,
automatic transmission, and several autonomous and ADAS features like
automatic emergency braking, lane-merge, and auto-passing controllers.
1 Introduction
The starting point of existing hybrid system verification approaches is the avail-
ability of nice mathematical models describing the transitions and trajecto-
ries. This central conceit severely restricts the applicability of the resulting
approaches. Real world control system “models” are typically a heterogeneous
mix of simulation code, differential equations, block diagrams, and hand-crafted
look-up tables. Extracting clean mathematical models from these descriptions
is usually infeasible. At the same time, rapid developments in Advanced Driving
Assist Systems (ADAS), autonomous vehicles, robotics, and drones now make
the need for effective and sound verification algorithms stronger than ever be-
fore. The DryVR framework presented in this paper aims to narrow the gap
between sound and practical verification for control systems.
Model assumptions Consider an ADAS feature like automatic emergency
braking system (AEB). The high-level logic deciding the timing of when and
for how long the brakes are engaged after an obstacle is detected by sensors is
implemented in a relatively clean piece of code and this logical module can be
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seen as a white-box . In contrast, the dynamics of vehicle itself, with hundreds of
parameters, is more naturally viewed as a black-box . That is, it can be simulated
or tested with different initial conditions and inputs, but it is nearly impossible
to write down a nice mathematical model.
The empirical observation motivating this work is that many control systems,
and especially automotive systems, share this combination of white and black
boxes (see other examples in Sections 2.1, 2.5, and A.2). In this paper, we
view hybrid systems as a combination of a white-box that specifies the mode
switches and a black-box that can simulate the continuous evolution in each
mode. Suppose the system has a set of modes  L and n continuous variables.
The mode switches are defined by a transition graph G which is a directed acyclic
graph (DAG) whose vertices and edges define the allowed mode switches and
the switching times. The black-box is a set of trajectories TL in Rn for each
mode in  L. We do not have a closed form description of TL, but instead, we have
a simulator , that can generate sampled data points on individual trajectories
for a given initial state and mode. Combining a transition graph G, a set of
trajectories TL, and a set of initial states in Rn, we obtain a hybrid system for
which executions, reachability, and trace containment can be defined naturally.
We have studied a suite of automotive systems such as powertrain con-
trol [40], automatic transmission control [46], and ADAS features like automatic
emergency braking (AEB), lane-change, and auto-passing, that are naturally
represented in the above style. In verifying a lane change or merge controller,
once the maneuver is activated, the mode transitions occur within certain time
intervals. In testing a powertrain control system, the mode transitions are
brought about by the driver and it is standard to describe typical driver classes
using time-triggered signals. Similar observations hold in other examples.
Safety verification algorithm With black-box modules in our hybrid sys-
tems, we address the challenge of providing guaranteed verification. Our ap-
proach is based on the idea of simulation-driven reachability analysis [30, 22, 23].
For a given mode ` ∈  L, finitely many simulations of the trajectories of ` and
a discrepancy function bounding the sensitivity of these trajectories, is used
to over-approximate the reachable states. For the key step of computing dis-
crepancy for modes that are now represented by black-boxes, we introduce a
probabilistic algorithm that learns the parameters of exponential discrepancy
functions from simulation data. The algorithm transforms the problem of learn-
ing the parameters of the discrepancy function to the problem of learning a
linear separator for a set of points in R2 that are obtained from transform-
ing the simulation data. A classical result in PAC learning, ensures that any
such discrepancy function works with high probability for all trajectories. We
performed dozens of experiments with a variety of black-box simulators and
observed that 15-20 simulation traces typically give a discrepancy function that
works for nearly 100% of all simulations. The reachability algorithm for the
hybrid system proceeds along the vertices of the transition graph in a topolog-
ically sorted order and this gives a sound bounded time verification algorithm,
provided the learned discrepancy function is correct.
Reasoning White-box transition graphs in our modelling, identify the switch-
ing sequences under which the black-box modules are exercised. Complex sys-
tems have involved transition graphs that describe subtle sequences in which
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the black-box modules are executed. To enable the analysis of such systems, we
identify reasoning principles that establish the safety of system under a com-
plex transition graph based on its safety under a simpler transition graph. We
define a notion of forward simulation between transition graphs that provides a
sufficient condition of when one transition graph “subsumes” another — if G1
is simulated by G2 then the reachable states of a hybrid system under G1 are
contained in the reachable states of the system under G2. Thus the safety of
the system under G2 implies the safety under G1. Moreover, we give a simple
polynomial time algorithm that can check if one transition graph is simulated
by another.
Our transition graphs are acyclic with transitions having bounded switching
times. Therefore, the executions of the systems we analyze are over a bounded
time, and have a bounded number of mode switches. An important question to
investigate is whether establishing the safety for bounded time, enables one can
conclude the safety of the system for an arbitrarily long time and for arbitrarily
many mode switches. With this in mind, we define a notion of sequential com-
position of transition graphs G1 and G2, such that switching sequences allowed
by the composed graph are the concatenation of the sequences allowed by G1
with those allowed by G2. Then we prove a sufficient condition on a transition
graph G such that safety of a system under G implies the safety of the system
under arbitrarily many compositions of G with itself.
Automotive applications We have implemented these ideas to create the
Data-driven System for Verification and Reasoning (DryVR). The tool is able
to automatically verify or find counter-examples in a few minutes, for all the
benchmark scenarios mentioned above. Reachability analysis combined with
compositional reasoning, enabled us to infer safety of systems with respect to
arbitrary transitions and duration.
Related work Most automated verification tools for hybrid systems rely on
analyzing a white-box mathematical model of the systems. They include tools
based on decidablity results [13, 37, 10, 3, 24, 32], semi-decision procedures that
over-approximate the reachable set of states through symbolic computation [36,
48, 7, 45, 56, 33, 4, 9], using abstractions [1, 12, 11, 19, 55, 53, 16, 39, 52, 5,
6, 49, 54], and using approximate decision procedures for fragments of first-
order logic [44]. More recently, there has been interest in developing simulation-
based verification tools [41, 18, 17, 42, 2, 25, 15, 23]. Even though these are
simulation based tools, they often rely on being to analyze a mathematical model
of the system. The type of analysis that they rely on include instrumentation
to extract a symbolic trace from a simulation [42], stochastic optimization to
search for counter-examples [2, 25], and sensitivity analysis [18, 17, 15, 23].
Some of the simulation based techniques only work for systems with linear
dynamics [34, 35]. Recent work on the APEX tool [50] for verifying trajectory
planning and tracking in autonomous vehicles is related our approach in that it
targets the same application domain.
3
2 Modeling/semantic framework
We introduce a powertrain control system from [40] as a running example to
illustrate the elements of our hybrid system modeling framework.
2.1 Powertrain control system
This system (Powertrn) models a highly nonlinear engine control system. The
relevant state variables of the model are intake manifold pressure (p), air-fuel
ratio (λ), estimated manifold pressure (pe) and intergrator state (i). The overall
system can be in one of four modes startup, normal, powerup, sensorfail. A
Simulink R© diagram describes the continuous evolution of the above variables.
In this paper, we mainly work on the Hybrid I/O Automaton Model in the suite
of powertrain control models. The Simulink R© model consists of continuous
variables describing the dynamics of the powertrain plant and sample-and-hold
variables as the controller. One of the key requirements to verify is that the
engine maintains the air-fuel ratio within a desired range in different modes
for a given set of driver behaviors. This requirement has implications on fuel
economy and emissions. For testing purposes, the control system designers work
with sets of driver profiles that essentially define families of switching signals
across the different modes. Previous verification results on this problem have
been reported in [21, 27] on a simplified version of the powertrain control model.
2.2 Transition graphs
We will use  L to denote a finite set of modes or locations of the system under
consideration. The discrete behavior or mode transitions are specified by what
we call a transition graph over  L.
Definition 2.1. A transition graph is a labeled, directed acyclic graph G =
〈 L,V, E , vlab, elab〉, where (a)  L is the set of vertex labels also called the set of
modes, (b) V the set of vertices, (c) E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, (d) vlab :
V →  L is a vertex labeling function that labels each vertex with a mode, and
(e) elab : E → R≥0×R≥0 is an edge labeling function that labels each edge with
a nonempty, closed, bounded interval defined by pair of non-negative reals.
Since G is a DAG, there is a nonempty subset Vinit ⊆ V of vertices with
no incoming edges and a nonempty subset Vterm ⊆ V of vertices with no out-
going edges. We define the set of initial locations of G as  Linit = {` | ∃ v ∈
Vinit, vlab(v) = `}. A (maximal) path of the graph G is a sequence pi =
v1, t1, v2, t2, . . . , vk such that, (a) v1 ∈ Vinit, (b) vk ∈ Vterm, and (c) for each
(vi, ti, vi+1) subsequence, there exists (vi, vi+1) ∈ E , and ti ∈ elab((vi, vi+1)).
PathsG is the set of all possible paths of G. For a given path pi = v1, t1, v2, t2, . . . ,
vk its trace, denoted by vlab(pi), is the sequence vlab(v1), t1, vlab(v2), t2, . . . ,
vlab(vk). Since G is a DAG, a trace of G can visit the same mode finitely many
times. TraceG is the set of all traces of G.
An example transition graph for the Powertrain system of Section 2.1 is shown
in Figure 1. The set of vertices V = {0, . . . , 4} and the vlab’s and elab’s appear
adjacent to the vertices and edges.
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Figure 1: A sample transition graph for Powertrain system.
2.2.1 Trace containment
We will develop reasoning techniques based on reachability, abstraction, com-
position, and substitutivity. To this end, we will need to establish containment
relations between the behaviors of systems. Here we define containment of tran-
sition graph traces. Consider transition graphs G1, G2, with modes  L1,  L2, and a
mode map lmap :  L1 →  L2. For a trace σ = `1, t1, `2, t2, . . . , `k ∈ TraceG1 , sim-
plifying notation, we denote by lmap(σ) the sequence lmap(`1), t1, lmap(`2), t2,
. . . , lmap(`k). We write G1 lmap G2 iff for every trace σ ∈ TraceG1 , there is a
trace σ′ ∈ TraceG2 such that lmap(σ) is a prefix of σ′.
Definition 2.2. Given graphs G1, G2 and a mode map lmap :  L1 →  L2, a
relation R ⊆ V1 × V2 is a forward simulation relation from G1 to G2 iff
(a) for each v ∈ V1init, there is u ∈ V2init such that (v, u) ∈ R,
(b) for every (v, u) ∈ R, lmap(vlab1(v)) = vlab2(u), and
(c) for every (v, v′) ∈ E1 and (v, u) ∈ R, there exists a finite set u1, . . . , uk such
that: (i) for each uj , (v, uj) ∈ R, and (ii) elab1((v, v′)) ⊆ ∪jelab2((u, uj)).
Proposition 2.3. If there exists a forward simulation relation from G1 to G2
with lmap then G1 lmap G2.
2.2.2 Sequential composition of graphs
We will find it convenient to define the sequential composition of two transition
graphs. Intuitively, the traces of the composition of G1 and G2 will be those that
can be obtained by concatenating a trace of G1 with a trace of G2. To keep
the definitions and notations simple, we will assume (when taking sequential
compositions) |Vinit| = |Vterm| = 1; this is true of the examples we analyze. It is
easy to generalize to the case when this does not hold. Under this assumption,
the unique vertex in Vinit will be denoted as vinit and the unique vertex in Vterm
will be denoted as vterm.
Definition 2.4. Given graphs G1 = 〈 L,V1, E1, vlab1, elab1〉 and G2 = 〈 L,V2, E2,
vlab2, elab2〉 such that vlab1(v1term) = vlab2(v2init), the sequential composition
of G1 and G2 is the graph G1 ◦G2 = 〈 L,V, E , vlab, elab〉 where
(a) V = (V1 ∪ V2) \ {v2init)},
(b) E = E1 ∪ {(v1term, u) | (v2init, u) ∈ E2} ∪ {(v, u) ∈ E2 | v 6= v2init},
(c) vlab(v) = vlab1(v) if v ∈ V1 and vlab(v) = vlab2(v) if v ∈ V2,
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(d) For edge (v, u) ∈ E , elab((v, u)) equals (i) elab1((v, u)), if u ∈ V1,
(ii) elab2((v2init, u)), if v = v1term, (iii) elab2((v, u)), otherwise.
Given our definition of trace containment between graphs, we can prove a
very simple property about sequential composition.
Proposition 2.5. Let G1 and G2 be two graphs with modes  L that can be
sequential composed. Then G1 id G1 ◦G2, where id is the identity map on  L.
The proposition follows from the fact that every path of G1 is a prefix of a
path of G1 ◦G2. Later in Section 4.1 we see examples of sequential composition.
2.3 Trajectories
The evolution of the system’s continuous state variables is formally described by
continuous functions of time called trajectories. Let n be the number of continu-
ous variables in the underlying hybrid model. A trajectory for an n-dimensional
system is a continuous function of the form τ : [0, T ]→ Rn, where T ≥ 0. The
interval [0, T ] is called the domain of τ and is denoted by τ.dom. The first state
τ(0) is denoted by τ.fstate, last state τ.lstate = τ(T ) and τ.ltime = T . For
a hybrid system with  L modes, each trajectory is labeled by a mode in  L. A
trajectory labeled by  L is a pair 〈τ, `〉 where τ is a trajectory and ` ∈  L.
A T1-prefix of 〈τ, `〉, for any T1 ∈ τ.dom, is the labeled-trajectory 〈τ1, `〉
with τ1 : [0, T1]→ Rn, such that for all t ∈ [0, T1], τ1(t) = τ(t). A set of labeled-
trajectories TL is prefix-closed if for any 〈τ, `〉 ∈ TL, any of its prefixes are also in
TL. A set TL is deterministic if for any pair 〈τ1, `1〉, 〈τ2, `2〉 ∈ TL, if τ1.fstate =
τ2.fstate and `1 = `2 then one is a prefix of the other. A deterministic, prefix-
closed set of labeled trajectories TL describes the behavior of the continuous
variables in modes  L. We denote by TLinit,` = {τ.fstate | 〈τ, `〉 ∈ TL}, the set
of initial states of trajectories in mode `. Without loss generality we assume
that TLinit,` is a connected, compact subset of Rn. We assume that trajectories
are defined for unbounded time, that is, for each ` ∈  L, T > 0, and x ∈ TLinit,`,
there exists a 〈τ, `〉 ∈ TL, with τ.fstate = x and τ.ltime = T .
In control theory and hybrid systems literature, the trajectories are assumed
to be generated from models like ordinary differential equations (ODEs) and
differential algebraic equations (DAEs). Here, we avoid an over-reliance on the
models generating trajectories and closed-form expressions. Instead, DryVR
works with sampled data of τ(·) generated from simulations or tests.
Definition 2.6. A simulator for a (deterministic and prefix-closed) set TL of
trajectories labeled by  L is a function (or a program) sim that takes as input
a mode label ` ∈  L, an initial state x0 ∈ TLinit,`, and a finite sequence of time
points t1, . . . , tk, and returns a sequence of states sim(x0, `, t1), . . . , sim(x0, `, tk)
such that there exists 〈τ, `〉 ∈ TL with τ.fstate = x0 and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
sim(x0, `, ti) = τ(ti).
The trajectories of the Powertrn system are described by a Simulink R© dia-
gram. The diagram has several switch blocks and input signals that can be set
appropriately to generate simulation data using the Simulink R© ODE solver.
For simplicity, we assume that the simulations are perfect (as in the last
equality of Definition 2.6). Formal guarantees of soundness of DryVR are not
compromised if we use validated simulations instead.
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Trajectory containment Consider sets of trajectories, TL1 labeled by  L1
and TL2 labeled by  L2, and a mode map lmap :  L1 →  L2. For a labeled tra-
jectory 〈τ, `〉 ∈ TL1, denote by lmap(〈τ, `〉) the labeled-trajectory 〈τ, lmap(`)〉.
Write TL1 lmap TL2 iff for every labeled trajectory 〈τ, `〉 ∈ TL1, lmap(〈τ, `〉) ∈
TL2.
2.4 Hybrid systems
Definition 2.7. An n-dimensional hybrid system H is a 4-tuple 〈 L,Θ, G, TL〉,
where (a)  L is a finite set of modes, (b) Θ ⊆ Rn is a compact set of initial states,
(c) G = 〈 L,V, E , elab〉 is a transition graph with set of modes  L, and (d) TL is
a set of deterministic, prefix-closed trajectories labeled by  L.
A state of the hybrid system H is a point in Rn×  L. The set of initial states
is Θ×  Linit. Semantics of H is given in terms of executions which are sequences of
trajectories consistent with the modes defined by the transition graph. An exe-
cution of H is a sequence of labeled trajectories α = 〈τ1, `1〉 . . . , 〈τk−1, `k−1〉, `k
in TL, such that (a) τ1.fstate ∈ Θ and `1 ∈  Linit, (b) the sequence path(α)
defined as `1, τ1.ltime, `2, . . . `k is in TraceG, and (c) for each consecutive tra-
jectory, τi+1.fstate = τi.lstate. The set of all executions of H is denoted by
ExecsH. The first and last states of an execution α = 〈τ1, `1〉 . . . , 〈τk−1, `k−1〉, `k
are α.fstate = τ1.fstate, α.lstate = τk−1.lstate, and α.fmode = `1 α.lmode = `k.
A state 〈x, `〉 is reachable at time t and vertex v (of graph G) if there exists
an execution α = 〈τ1, `1〉 . . . , 〈τk−1, `k−1〉, `k ∈ ExecsH, a path pi = v1, t1, . . . vk
in PathsG, i ∈ {1, . . . k}, and t′ ∈ τi.dom such that vlab(pi) = path(α), v = vi,
` = `i, x = τi(t
′), and t = t′ +
∑i−1
j=1 tj . The set of reachable states, reach tube,
and states reachable at a vertex v are defined as follows.
ReachTubeH = {〈x, `, t〉|for some v, 〈x, `〉 is reachable at time t and vertex v}
ReachH = {〈x, `〉 | for some v, t, 〈x, `〉 is reachable at time t and vertex v}
ReachvH = {〈x, `〉 | for some t, 〈x, `〉 is reachable at time t and vertex v}
Given a set of (unsafe) states U ⊆ Rn ×  L, the bounded safety verification
problem is to decide whether ReachH ∩ U = ∅. In Section 3 we will present
DryVR’s algorithm for solving this decision problem.
Remark 2.8. Defining paths in a graph G to be maximal (i.e., end in a vertex
in Vterm) coupled with the definition above for executions in H, ensures that for
a vertex v with outgoing edges in G, the execution must leave the mode vlab(v)
within time bounded by the largest time in the labels of outgoing edges from v.
An instance of the bounded safety verification problem is defined by (a) the
hybrid system for the Powertrn which itself is defined by the transition graph
of Figure 1 and the trajectories defined by the Simulink R© model, and (b) the
unsafe set (Up): in powerup mode, t > 4 ∧ λ /∈ [12.4, 12.6], in normal mode,
t > 4 ∧ λ /∈ [14.6, 14.8].
Containment between graphs and trajectories can be leveraged to conclude
the containment of the set of reachable states of two hybrid systems.
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Proposition 2.9. Consider a pair of hybrid systems Hi = 〈 Li,Θi, Gi, TLi〉,
i ∈ {1, 2} and mode map lmap :  L1 →  L2. If Θ1 ⊆ Θ2, G1 lmap G2, and
TL1 lmap TL2, then ReachH1 ⊆ ReachH2 .
2.5 ADAS and autonomous vehicle benchmarks
This is a suite of benchmarks we have created representing various common
scenarios used for testing ADAS and Autonomous driving control systems. The
hybrid system for a scenario is constructed by putting together several individual
vehicles. The higher-level decisions (paths) followed by the vehicles are captured
by transition graphs while the detailed dynamics of each vehicle comes from a
black-box Simulink R© simulator from Mathworks R© [47].
Each vehicle has several continuous variables including the x, y-coordinates
of the vehicle on the road, its velocity, heading, and steering angle. The vehi-
cle can be controlled by two input signals, namely the throttle (acceleration or
brake) and the steering speed. By choosing appropriate values for these input
signals, we have defined the following modes for each vehicle — cruise: move for-
ward at constant speed, speedup: constant acceleration, brake: constant (slow)
deceleration, em brake: constant (hard) deceleration. In addition, we have de-
signed lane switching modes ch left and ch right in which the acceleration and
steering are controlled in such a manner that the vehicle switches to its left
(resp. right) lane in a certain amount of time.
For each vehicle, we mainly analyze four variables: absolute position (sx)
and velocity (vx) orthogonal to the road direction (x-axis), and absolute po-
sition (sy) and velocity (vy) along the road direction (y-axis). The throttle
and steering are captured using the four variables. We will use subscripts to
distinguish between different vehicles. The following scenarios are constructed
by defining appropriate sets of initial states and transitions graphs labeled by
the modes of two or more vehicles. In all of these scenarios a primary safety
requirement is that the vehicles maintain safe separation. See Appendix A.1 for
more details on initial states and transition graphs of each scenario.
Merge: Vehicle A in the left lane is behind vehicle B in the right lane. A switches
through modes cruise, speedup, ch right, and cruise over specified intervals
to merge behind B. Variants of this scenario involve B also switching to
speedup or brake.
AutoPassing: Vehicle A starts behind B in the same lane, and goes through a
sequence of modes to overtake B. If B switches to speedup before A enters
speedup then A aborts and changes back to right lane.
Merge3: Same as AutoPassing with a third car C always ahead of B.
AEB: Vehicle A cruises behind B and B stops. A transits from cruise to em brake
possibly over several different time intervals as governed by different sen-
sors and reaction times.
3 Invariant verification
A subproblem for invariant verification is to compute ReachTubeH, or more
specifically, the reachtubes for the set of trajectories TL in a given mode, up to a
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time bound. This is a difficult problem, even when TL is generated by white-box
models. The algorithms in [17, 22, 29] approximate reachtubes using simulations
and sensitivity analysis of ODE models generating TL. Here, we begin with a
probabilistic method for estimating sensitivity from black-box simulators.
3.1 Discrepancy functions
Sensitivity of trajectories is formalized by the notion of discrepancy functions
[22]. For a set TL, a discrepancy function is a uniformly continuous function β :
Rn×Rn×R≥0 → R≥0, such that for any pair of identically labeled trajectories
〈τ1, `〉, 〈τ2, `〉 ∈ TL, and any t ∈ τ1.dom ∩ τ2.dom: (a) β upper-bounds the
distance between the trajectories, i.e.,
|τ1(t)− τ2(t)| ≤ β(τ1.fstate, τ2.fstate, t), (1)
and (b) β converges to 0 as the initial states converge, i.e., for any trajectory
τ and t ∈ τ.dom, if a sequence of trajectories τ1, . . . , τk, . . . has τk.fstate →
τ.fstate, then β(τk.fstate, τ.fstate, t) → 0. In [22] it is shown how given a β,
condition (a) can used to over-approximate reachtubes from simulations, and
condition (b) can be used to make these approximations arbitrarily precise.
Techniques for computing β from ODE models are developed in [29, 28, 38], but
these are not applicable here in absence of such models. Instead we present a
simple method for discovering discrepancy functions that only uses simulations.
Our method is based on classical results on PAC learning linear separators [43].
We recall these before applying them to find discrepancy functions.
3.1.1 Learning linear separators.
For Γ ⊆ R× R, a linear separator is a pair (a, b) ∈ R2 such that
∀(x, y) ∈ Γ. x ≤ ay + b. (2)
Let us fix a subset Γ that has a (unknown) linear separator (a∗, b∗). Our goal
is to discover some (a, b) that is a linear seprator for Γ by sampling points in
Γ 1. The assumption is that elements of Γ can be drawn according to some
(unknown) distribution D. With respect to D, the error of a pair (a, b) from
satisfying Equation 2, is defined to be errD(a, b) = D({(x, y) ∈ Γ | x > ay + b})
where D(X) is the measure of set X under distribution D. Thus, the error is
the measure of points (w.r.t. D) that (a, b) is not a linear separator for. There
is a very simple (probabilistic) algorithm that finds a pair (a, b) that is a linear
separator for a large fraction of points in Γ, as follows.
1. Draw k pairs (x1, y1), . . . (xk, yk) from Γ according to D; the value of k
will be fixed later.
2. Find (a, b) ∈ R2 such that xi ≤ ayi + b for all i ∈ {1, . . . k}.
Step 2 involves checking feasibility of a linear program, and so can be done
efficiently. This algorithm, with high probability, finds a linear separator for a
large fraction of points.
1We prefer to present the learning question in this form as opposed to one where we learn
a Boolean concept because it is closer to the task at hand.
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Proposition 3.1. Let , δ ∈ R+. If k ≥ 1 ln 1δ then, with probability ≥ 1 − δ,
the above algorithm finds (a, b) such that errD(a, b) < .
Proof. The result follows from the PAC-learnability of concepts with low VC-
dimension [43]. However, since the proof is very simple in this case, we reproduce
it here for completeness. Let k be as in the statement of the proposition, and
suppose the pair (a, b) identified by the algorithm has error > . We will bound
the probability of this happening.
Let B = {(x, y) |x > ay+ b}. We know that D(B) > . The algorithm chose
(a, b) only because no element from B was sampled in Step 1. The probability
that this happens is ≤ (1− )k. Observing that (1− s) ≤ e−s for any s, we get
(1− )k ≤ e−k ≤ e− ln 1δ = δ. This gives us the desired result.
3.1.2 Learning discrepancy functions
Discrepancy functions will be computed from simulation data independently for
each mode. Let us fix a mode ` ∈  L, and a domain [0, T ] for each trajectory.
The discrepancy functions that we will learn from simulation data, will be one
of two different forms, and we discuss how these are obtained.
Global exponential discrepancy (GED) is a function of the form
β(x1, x2, t) = |x1 − x2|Keγt.
Here K and γ are constants. Thus, for any pair of trajectories τ1 and τ2 (for
mode `), we have
∀t ∈ [0, T ]. |τ1(t)− τ2(t)| ≤ |τ1.fstate − τ2.fstate|Keγt.
Taking logs on both sides and rearranging terms, we have
∀t. ln |τ1(t)− τ2(t)||τ1.fstate − τ2.fstate| ≤ γt+ lnK.
It is easy to see that a global exponential discrepancy is nothing but a linear
separator for the set Γ consisting of pairs (ln |τ1(t)=τ2(t)||τ1.fstate−τ2.fstate| , t) for all pairs
of trajectories τ1, τ2 and time t. Using the sampling based algorithm described
before, we could construct a GED for a mode ` ∈  L, where sampling from Γ
reduces to using the simulator to generate traces from different states in TLinit,`.
Proposition 3.1 guarantees the correctness, with high probability, for any sep-
arator discovered by the algorithm. However, for our reachability algorithm to
not be too conservative, we need K and γ to be small. Thus, when solving the
linear program in Step 2 of the algorithm, we search for a solution minimizing
γT + lnK.
Piece-wise exponential discrepancy (PED). The second form of dis-
crepancy functions we consider, depends upon dividing up the time domain
[0, T ] into smaller intervals, and finding a global exponential discrepancy for
each interval. Let 0 = t0, t1, . . . tN = T be an increasing sequence of time
points. Let K, γ1, γ2, . . . γN be such that for every pair of trajectories τ1, τ2
(of mode `), for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and t ∈ [ti−1, ti], |τ1(t) = τ2(t)| ≤
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|τ1(ti−1)− τ2(ti−1)|Keγit. Under such circumstances, the discrepancy function
itself can be seen to be given as
β(x1, x2, t) = |x1 − x2|Ke
∑i−1
j=1 γj(tj−tj−1)+γi(t−ti−1) for t ∈ [ti−1, ti].
If the time points 0 = t0, t1, . . . tN = T are fixed, then the constants K, γ1, γ2, . . .
γN can be discovered using the learning approach described for GED; here, to
discover γi, we take Γi to be the pairs obtained by restricting the trajectories to
be between times ti−1 and ti. The sequence of time points ti are also dynamically
constructed by our algorithm based on the following approach. Our experience
suggests that a value for γ that is ≥ 2 results in very conservative reach tube
computation. Therefore, the time points ti are constructed inductively to be as
large as possible, while ensuring that γi < 2.
3.1.3 Experiments on learning discrepancy
We used the above algorithm to learn discrepancy functions for dozens of modes
with complex, nonlinear trajectories. Our experiments suggest that around 10-
20 simulation traces are adequate for computing both global and piece-wise
discrepancy functions. For each mode we use a set Strain of simulation traces
that start from independently drawn random initial states in TLinit,` to learn a
discrepancy function. Each trace may have 100-10000 time points, depending
on the relevant time horizon and sample times. Then we draw another set Stest
of 1000 simulations traces for validating the computed discrepancy. For every
pair of trace in Stest and for every time point, we check whether the computed
discrepancy satisfies Equation 1. We observe that for |Strain| > 10 the computed
discrepancy function is correct for 96% of the points Stest in and for |Strain| > 20
it is correct for more than 99.9%, across all experiments.
3.2 Verification algorithm
In this section, we present algorithms to solve the bounded verification problem
for hybrid systems using learned exponential discrepancy functions. We first
introduce an algorithm GraphReach (Algorithm 1) which takes as input a hybrid
system H = 〈 L,Θ, G, TL〉 and returns a set of reachtubes—one for each vertex
of G—such that their union over-approximates ReachTubeH.
GraphReach maintains two data-structures: (a) RS accumulates pairs of the
form 〈RT, v〉, where v ∈ V and RT is its corresponding reachtube; (b) VerInit
accumulates pairs of the form 〈S, v〉, where v ∈ V and S ⊂ Rn is the set of states
from which the reachtube in v is to be computed. Each v could be in multiple
such pairs in RS and VerInit . Initially, RS = ∅ and VerInit = {〈Θ, vinit〉}.
LearnDiscrepancy(Sinit, d , `) computes the discrepancy function for mode
`, from initial set Sinit and upto time d using the algorithm of Section 3.1.
ReachComp(Sinit, d, β) first generates finite simulation traces from Sinit and then
bloats the traces to compute a reachtube using the discrepancy function β. This
step is similar to the algorithm for dynamical systems given in [22].
The GraphReach algorithm proceeds as follows: first, a topologically sorted
array of the vertices of the DAG G is computed in Order (Line 1). The pointer
ptr iterates over the Order and for each vertex curv the following is computed.
The variable dt is set to the maximum transition time to other vertices from
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curv (Line 5). For each possible initial set Sinit corresponding to curv in VerInit ,
the algorithm computes a discrepancy function (Line 7) and uses it to compute
a reachtube from Sinit up to time dt (Line 8). For each successor nextv of curv ,
the restriction of the computed reachtube RT to the corresponding transition
time interval elab((curv ,nextv)) is set as an initial set for nextv (Lines 11–12).
Algorithm 1: GraphReach(H) computes bounded time reachtubes for
each vertex of the transition G of hybrid system H.
1 RS ← ∅; VerInit ← {〈Θ, vinit〉}; Order ← TopSort(G);
2 for ptr = 0 : len(Order)− 1 do
3 curv ← Order[ptr] ;
4 `← vlab(curv);
5 dt ← max{t′ ∈ R≥0|∃vs ∈ V, (curv , vs) ∈ E , (t, t′)← elab ((curv , vs))};
6 for Sinit ∈ {S | 〈S, curv〉 ∈ VerInit} do
7 β ← LearnDiscrepancy(Sinit, dt , `);
8 RT ← ReachComp(Sinit, dt , β);
9 RS ← RS ∪ 〈RT, curv〉;
10 for nextv ∈ curv .succ do
11 (t, t′)← elab ((curv , nextv));
12 VerInit ← VerInit ∪ 〈Restr(RT, (t, t′)), nextv〉;
13 return RS ;
The invariant verification algorithm VerifySafety decides safety of H with
respect to a given unsafe set U and uses GraphReach. The detailed pseu-
docode appears in Appendix A.3. This algorithm proceeds in a way similar
to the simulation-based verification algorithms for dynamical and hybrid sys-
tems [22, 30]. Given initial set Θ and transition graph G of H, this algorithm
partitions Θ into several subsets, and then for each subset S it checks whether
the computed over-approximate reachtube RS from S intersects with U : (a) If
RS is disjoint, the system is safe starting from S; (b) if certain part of a reach-
tube RT is contained in U , the system is declared as unsafe and RT with the
the corresponding path of the graph are returned as counter-example witnesses;
(c) if neither of the above conditions hold, then the algorithm performs re-
finement to get a more precise over-approximation of RS. Several refinement
strategies are implemented in DryVR to accomplish the last step. Broadly,
these strategies rely on splitting the initial set S into smaller sets (this gives
tighter discrepancy in the subsequent vertices) and splitting the edge labels of
G into smaller intervals (this gives smaller initial sets in the vertices).
The above description focuses on invariant properties, but the algorithm and
our implementation in DryVR can verify a useful class of temporal properties.
These are properties in which the time constraints only refer to the time since
the last mode transition. For example, for the Powertrn benchmark the tool
verifies requirements like “after 4s in normal mode, the air-fuel ratio should be
contained in [14.6, 14.8] and after 4s in powerup it should be in [12.4, 12.6]”.
Correctness Given a correct discrepancy function for each mode, we can
prove the soundness and relative completeness of Algorithm 2. This analysis
closely follows the proof of Theorem 19 and Theorem 21 in [20]. Combining
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(b) Unsafe execution.
Figure 2: AutoPassing verification. Vehicle A’s (red) modes are shown above each
subplot. Vehicle B (green) is in cruise. Top: sxA, sxB . Bottom: syA, syB .
this with the probabilistic correctness of the LearnDiscrepancy , we obtain the
following probabilistic soundness guarantee.
Theorem 3.2. If the β’s returned by LearnDiscrepancy are always discrepancy
functions for corresponding modes, then VerifySafety(H, U) (Algorithm 2) is
sound. That is, if it outputs “SAFE”, then H is safe with respect to U and if it
outputs “UNSAFE” then there exists an execution of H that enters U .
3.3 Experiments on safety verification
The algorithms have been implemented in DryVR and have been used to auto-
matically verify the benchmarks from Section 2 and an Automatic Transmission
System (Appendix A.2). The transition graph, the initial set, and unsafe set
are given in a text file. DryVR uses simulators for modes, and outputs ei-
ther “Safe” of “Unsafe”. Reachtubes or counter-examples computed during the
analysis are also stored in text files.
The implementation is in Python using the MatLab’s Python API for access-
ing the Simulink R© simulators. Py-GLPK [31] is used to find the parameters of
discrepancy functions; either global (GED) or piece-wise (PED) discrepancy can
be selected by the user. Z3 [14] is used for reachtube operations. At this stage,
all the benchmarks we are working on heavily rely on Mathworks R© Simulink R©.
We don’t have a public Mathworks R© license to release the tool, and it is com-
plicated for the users to build a connection between DryVR and their own
Simulink R© models. We will release DryVR soon after we move the blackbox
benchmarks to a different open source software.
Figure 2 shows example plots of computed safe reachtubes and counter-
examples for a simplified AutoPassing in which vehicle B stays in the cruise
always. As before, vehicle A goes through a sequence of modes to overtake B.
Initially, for both i ∈ {A,B}, sxi = vxi = 0 and vyi = 1, i.e., both are cruising
at constant speed at the center of the right lane; initial positions along the lane
are syA ∈ [0, 2], syB ∈ [15, 17]. Figure 2a shows the lateral positions (sxA in
red and sxB in green, in the top subplot), and the positions along the lane (syA
in red and syB in green, in the bottom plot). Vehicle A moves to left lane (sx
decreases) and then back to the right, while B remains in the right lane, as A
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Model TH Initial set U Ref Safe Runtime
Powertrn
(5 vers, 6 edges)
80 λ ∈ [14.6, 14.8] Up 2 3 217.4s
AutoPassing 50 syA ∈ [−1, 1] syB ∈ [14, 16] Uc 4 3 208.4s
(12 vers, 13 edges) 50 syA ∈ [−1, 1] syB ∈ [4, 6.5] Uc 5 7 152.5s
Merge 50 sxA ∈ [−5, 5] syB ∈ [−2, 2] Uc 0 3 55.0s
(7 vers, 7 edges) 50 sxA ∈ [−5, 5] syB ∈ [2, 10] Uc - 7 38.7s
Merge3 50
syA ∈ [−3, 3] syB ∈ [14, 23]
syC ∈ [36, 45] Uc 4 3 197.6s
(6 vers, 5 edges) 50
syA ∈ [−3, 3] syB ∈ [14, 15]
syC ∈ [16, 20] Uc - 7 21.3s
ATS
(4 vers, 3 edges)
50 Erpm ∈ [900, 1000] Ut 2 3 109.2s
Table 1: Safety verification results. Numbers below benchmark names: # vertices
and edges of G, TH: duration of shortest path in G, Ref: # refinements performed;
Runtime: overall running time.
overtakes B (bottom plot). The unsafe set (|sxA− sxB | < 2 & |syA− syB | < 2)
is proved to be disjoint from computed reachtube. With a different initial set,
syB ∈ [30, 40], DryVR finds counter-example (Figure 2b).
Table 1 summarizes some of the verification results obtained using DryVR.
ATS is an automatic transmission control system (see Appendix A.2 for more
details). These experiments were performed on a laptop with Intel Core i7-
6600U CPU and 16 GB RAM. The initial range of only the salient continuous
variables are shown in the table. The unsafe sets are discussed with the model
description. For example Uc means two vehicles are too close. For all the
benchmarks, the algorithm terminated in a few minutes which includes the
time to simulate, learn discrepancy, generate reachtubes, check the safety of the
reachtube, over all refinements.
For the results presented in Table 1, we used GED. The reachtube gener-
ated by PED for Powertrn is more precise, but for the rest, the reachtubes and
the verification times using both GED and PED were comparable. In addi-
tion to the VerifySafety algorithm, DryVR also looks for counter-examples by
quickly generating random executions of the hybrid system. If any of these ex-
ecutions is found to be unsafe, DryVR will return “Unsafe” without starting
the VerifySafety algorithm.
4 Reasoning principles for trace containment
For a fixed unsafe set U and two hybrid systems H1 and H2, proving ReachH1 ⊆
ReachH2 and the safety of H2, allows us to conclude the safety of H1. Proposi-
tion 2.9 establishes that proving containment of traces, trajectories, and initial
sets of two hybrid systems, ensures the containment of their respective reach
sets. These two observations together give us a method of concluding the safety
of one system, from the safety of another, provided we can check trace contain-
ment of two graphs, and trajectory containment of two trajectory sets. In our
examples, the set of modes  L and the set of trajectories TL is often the same
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between the hybrid systems we care about. So in this section present different
reasoning principles to check trace containment between two graphs.
Semantically, a transition graph G can be viewed as one-clock timed au-
tomaton, i.e., one can constructed a timed automaton T with one-clock variable
such that the timed traces of T are exactly the traces of G. This observation,
coupled with the fact that checking the timed language containment of one-
clock timed automata [51] is decidable, allows one to conclude that checking if
G1 lmap G2 is decidable. However the algorithm in [51] has non-elementary
complexity. Our next observation establishes that forward simulation between
graphs can be checked in polynomial time. Combined with Proposition 2.3, this
gives a simple sufficient condition for trace containment that can be efficiently
checked.
Proposition 4.1. Given graphs G1 and G2, and mode map lmap, checking if
there is a forward simulation from G1 to G2 is in polynomial time.
Proof. The result can be seen to follow from the algorithm for checking timed
simulations between timed automata [8] and the correspondence between one-
clock timed automata; the fact that the automata have only one clock ensures
that the region construction is poly-sized as opposed to exponential-sized. How-
ever, in the special case of transition graphs there is a more direct algorithm
which does not involve region construction that we describe here.
Observe that if {Ri}i∈I is a family of forward simulations between G1 and
G2 then ∪i∈IRi is also a forward simulation. Thus, like classical simulations,
there is a unique largest forward simulation between two graphs that is the
greatest fixpoint of a functional on relations over states of the transition graph.
Therefore, starting from the relation V1×V2, one can progressively remove pairs
(v, u) such that v is not simulated by u, until a fixpoint is reached. Moreover,
in this case, since G1 is a DAG, one can guarantee that the fixpoint will be
reached in |V1| iterations.
Executions of hybrid systems are for bounded time, and bounded number of
mode switches. This is because our transition graphs are acyclic and the labels
on edges are bounded intervals. Sequential composition of graphs allows one
to consider switching sequences that are longer and of a longer duration. We
now present observations that will allow us to conclude the safety of a hybrid
system with long switching sequences based on the safety of the system under
short switching sequences. To do this we begin by observing simple properties
about sequential composition of graphs. In what follows, all hybrid systems we
consider will be over a fixed set of modes  L and trajectory set TL. Also id will
be identity function on  L. Our first observation is that trace containment is
consistent with sequential composition.
Proposition 4.2. Let Gi, G
′
i, i ∈ {1, 2}, be four transition graphs over  L such
that G1 ◦ G2 and G′1 ◦ G′2 are defined, and Gi id G′i for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then
G1 ◦G2 id G′1 ◦G′2.
Next we observe that sequential composition of graphs satisfies the “semi-
group property”.
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Proposition 4.3. Let G1, G2 be graphs over  L for which G1 ◦ G2 is defined.
Let v1term be the unique terminal vertex of G1. Consider the following hybrid sys-
tems: H = 〈 L,Θ, G1◦G2, TL〉, H1 = 〈 L,Θ, G1, TL〉, and H2 = 〈 L,Reachv1termH1 ,G2,TL〉. Then ReachH = ReachH1 ∪ ReachH2 .
Consider a graph G such that G ◦G is defined. Let H be the hybrid system
with transition graph G, and H′ be the hybrid system with transition graph
G ◦G; the modes, trajectories, and initial set for H and H′ are the same. Now
by Proposition 2.5 and 2.9, we can conclude that ReachH ⊆ ReachH′ . Our main
result of this section is that under some conditions, the converse also holds.
This is useful because it allows us to conclude the safety of H′ from the safety
of H. In other words, we can conclude the safety of a hybrid system for long,
possibly unbounded, switching sequences (namely H′) from the safety of the
system under short switching sequences (namely H).
Theorem 4.4. Suppose G is such that G ◦G is defined. Let vterm be the unique
terminal vertex of G. For natural number i ≥ 1, define Hi = 〈 L,Θ, Gi, TL〉,
where Gi is the i-fold sequential composition of G with itself. In particular,
H1 = 〈 L,Θ, G, TL〉. If ReachvtermH1 ⊆ Θ then for all i, ReachHi ⊆ ReachH1 .
Proof. Let Θ1 = Reach
vterm
H1 . From the condition in the theorem, we know that
Θ1 ⊆ Θ. Let us define H′i = 〈 L,Θ1, Gi, TL〉. Observe that from Proposition 2.9,
we have ReachH′i ⊆ ReachHi .
The theorem is proved by induction on i. The base case (for i = 1) triv-
ially holds. For the induction step, assume that ReachHi ⊆ ReachH1 . Since
◦ is associative, using Proposition 4.3 and the induction hypothesis, we have
ReachHi+1 = ReachH1 ∪ ReachH′i ⊆ ReachH1 ∪ ReachHi = ReachH1 .
Theorem 4.4 allows one to determine the set of reachable states of a set
of modes  L with respect to graph Gi, provided G satisfies the conditions in
the statement. This observation can be generalized. If a graph G2 satisfies
conditions similar to those in Theorem 4.4, then using Proposition 4.3, we can
conclude that the reachable set with respect to graph G1 ◦Gi2 ◦G3 is contained
in the reachable set with respect to graph G1 ◦G2 ◦G3. The formal statement
of this observation and its proof is skipped in the interest of space, but we will
use it in our experiments.
4.1 Experiments on trace containment reasoning
Graph simulation Consider the AEB system of Section 2.5 with the scenario
where Vehicle B is stopped ahead of vehicle A, and A transits from cruise to
em brake to avoid colliding with B. In the actual system (G2 of Figure 3), two
different sensor systems trigger the obstacle detection and emergency braking
at time intervals [1, 2] and [2.5, 3.5] and take the system from vertex 0 (cruise)
to two different vertices labeled with em brake.
To illustrate trace containment reasoning, consider a simpler graph G1 that
allows a single transition of A from cruise to em brake over the interval bigger
[0.5, 4.5]. Using Proposition 2.9 and checking that graph G2 id G1, it follows
that verifying the safety of AEB with G1 is adequate to infer the safety with
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(a) Transition graph G1. (b) Transition graph G2.
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Figure 3: Graphs and reachtubes for the Automatic Emergency Braking AEB system.
G2. Figure 3c shows that the safe reachtubes returned by the algorithm for G1
in red, indeed contain the reachtubes for G2 (in blue and gray).
Sequential composition We revisit the Powertrn example of Section 2.1.
The initial set Θ and unsafe set are the same as in Table 1. Let GA be
the graph (v0,startup)
[5,10]−−−→ (v1,normal) [10,15]−−−−→ (v2,powerup), and GB be the
graph (v0,powerup)
[5,10]−−−→ (v1,normal) [10,15]−−−−→ (v2,powerup). The graph G1 =
(v0,startup)
[5,10]−−−→ (v1,normal) [10,15]−−−−→ (v2,powerup) [5,10]−−−→ (v3,normal) [10,15]−−−−→
(v4,powerup), can be expressed as the composition G1 = GA ◦ GB . Consider
the two hybrid systems Hi = 〈 L,Θi, Gi, TL〉, i ∈ {A,B} with ΘA = Θ and
ΘB = Reach
v2
HA . DryVR’s estimate of ΘB had λ in the range from 14.68
to 14.71. The reachset Reachv2HB computed by DryVR had λ from 14.69
to 14.70. The remaining variables also were observed to satisfy the contain-
ment condition. Therefore, Reachv2HB ⊆ ΘB . Consider the two hybrid systemsHi = 〈 L,Θ, Gi, TL〉, i ∈ {1, 2}, where G1 is (defined above) GA ◦ GB , and
G2 = GA ◦GB ◦GB ◦GB . Using Theorem 4.4 it suffices to analyze H1 to verify
H2. H1 was been proved to be safe by DryVR without any refinement. As a
sanity check, we also verified the safety of H2. DryVR proved H2 safe without
any refinement as well.
5 Conclusions
The work presented in this paper takes an alternative view that complete math-
ematical models of hybrid systems are unavailable. Instead, the available system
description combines a black-box simulator and a white-box transition graph.
Starting from this point of view, we have developed the semantic framework,
a probabilistic verification algorithm, and results on simulation relations and
sequential composition for reasoning about complex hybrid systems over long
switching sequences. Through modeling and analysis of a number of automo-
tive control systems using implementations of the proposed approach, we hope
to have demonstrated their promise. One direction for further exploration in
this vein, is to consider more general timed and hybrid automata models of the
white-box, and develop the necessary algorithms and the reasoning techniques.
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A Appendix
A.1 ADAS and autonomous vehicle venchmarks
We provide more details for the different scenarios used for testing ADAS and
Autonomous driving control systems.
Recall, that each vehicle model in Simulink R© has several continuous variables
including the x, y-coordinates of the vehicle on the road, its velocity, heading,
steering angle, etc. The vehicle can be controlled by two input signals, namely
the throttle (acceleration or brake) and the steering speed. By choosing appro-
priate values of these input signals, we have defined the following modes for each
vehicle (a) cruise: move forward at constant speed, speedup: constant accelera-
tion, brake: constant (slow) deceleration, em brake: constant (hard). We have
designed lane switching modes ch left and ch right in which the acceleration and
steering are controlled in such a manner that the vehicle switches to its left
(resp. right) lane in a certain amount of time.
For each vehicle, we mainly analyze four variables: absolute position (sx)
and velocity vx orthogonal to the road direction (x-axis), and absolute position
(sy) and velocity vy along the road direction (x-axis). The throttle and steering
information can be expressed using the four variables. We will use subscripts to
distinguish between different vehicles. The following scenarios are constructed
by defining appropriate sets of initial states and transitions graphs labeled by
the modes of two or more vehicles.
MergeBehind: Initial condition: Vehicle A is in left and vehicle B is in the right
lane; initial positions and speeds are in some range; A is in cruise mode,
and B is in cruise or speedup. Transition graph: Vehicle A goes through
the mode sequence speedup, ch right, cruise with specified intervals of time
to transit from mode to another mode. Requirement: A merges behind B
within a time bound and maintains at least a given safe separation.
MergeAhead: Initial condition: Same as MergeBehind with except that B is in
cruise or brake mode. Transition graph: Same structure as MergeBehind
with different timing parameters. Requirement: A merges ahead of B and
maintains at least a given safe separation.
AutoPassing: Initial condition: Vehicle A behind B in the same lane, with A in
speedup and B in cruise; initial positions and speeds are in some range.
Transition graph: A goes through the mode sequence ch left, speedup,
brake, and ch right, cruise with specified time intervals in each mode to
complete the overtake maneuver. If B switches to speedup before A enters
speedup then A aborts and changes back to right lane. If B switches to
brake before A enters ch left, then A should adjust the time to switch
to ch left to avoid collision. Requirement: Vehicle A overtakes B while
maintaining minimal safe separation.
AEB: (Emergency brakes) Initial condition: Vehicle A behind B in the same
lane with A in cruise, B is stopped (in cruise mode with velocity 0). Initial
positions and speeds are in some range; Transition graph: A transits from
cruise to em brake over a given interval of time or several disjoint intervals
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of time. Requirement: Vehicle A stops behind B and maintains at least a
given safe separation.
MergeBetween: Initial condition: Vehicle A, B, C are all in the same lane, with
A behind B, B behind C, and in the cruise mode, initial positions and
speeds are in some range. Transition graph: A goes through the mode
sequence ch left, speedup, brake, and ch right, cruise with specified time
intervals in each mode to overtake B. C transits from cruise to speedup
then transits back to cruise, so C is always ahead of A. Requirement:
Vehicle A merges between B and C and any two vehicles maintain at least
a given safe separation.
A.2 Automatic transmission control
We provide some details about the Automatic transmission control benchmark
that we have modeled as a hybrid system that combine white-box and black-box
components and we have verified using DryVR’s safety verification algorithm.
This is a slightly modified version of the Automatic Transmission model
provided by Mathworks R© as a Simulink R© demo [46]. It is a model of an auto-
matic transmission controller that exhibits both continuous and discrete behav-
ior. The model has been previously used by S-taliro [26] for falsifying certain
requirements. We are not aware of any verification results for this system.
For our experiments, we made some minor modifications to the Simulink R©
model to create the hybrid system ATS. This allows us to simulate the vehicle
from any one of the four modes, namely, gear1, gear2, gear3 and gear4. Although
the system has many variables, we are primarily interested in the car Speed (v),
engine RPM (Erpm), impeller torque (Ti), output torque (To), and transmis-
sion RPM (Trpm), and therefore, use simulations that record these. Transition
graph of ATS encodes transition sequences and intervals for shifting from gear1
through to gear4. Requirement of interest is that the engine RPM is less than
a specified maximum value, which in turn is important for limiting the thermal
and mechanical stresses on the cylinders and camshafts. Typical unsafe set Ut
could be Erpm > 4000.
A.3 Safety verification algorithm
The safety verification algorithm is shown in 2. It proceeds along the line of the
simulation-based verification algorithms presented in [22, 29, 23].
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Algorithm 2: VerifySafety(H,U) verifies safety of hybrid system H with
respect to unsafe set U .
initially: I.push(Partition(Θ))
1 while I 6= ∅ do
2 S ← I.pop();
3 RS ← GraphReach(H) ;
4 if RS ∩ U = ∅ then
5 continue;
6 else if ∃(x, l, t) ∈ RT s.t. 〈RT, v〉 ∈ RS and (x, l, t) ⊆ U then
7 return UNSAFE, 〈RT, v〉
8 else
9 I.push(Partition(S)) ;
10 Or, G← RefineGraph(G) ;
11 return SAFE
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